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RECENT CASES 627
EMINENT DOMAIN-ATTORNEY FEES-RELIANCE UPON A ONE-THIRD
CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT IN AWARDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY
FEES WAS AN ERROR
After initial offers to purchase1 had been rejected, the City of
Bismarck filed a complaint in eminent domain asking for the con-
demnation of the Thorn land 2 for airport expansion.3 The Thorns
had a one-third contingent fee agreement with their attorney. 4 After
a jury award of $363,640 -in the condemnation proceedings, motions
were filed leading to a lower court finding that $71,213.135 was a
fair and reasonable amount for attorney's fees.6 The lower court
ordered the city to pay that amount along with certain other costs,
including expert witness fees of $6,327. 7 The city appealed, contend-
ing the trial court erred in not using guidelines for determining
reasonable attorney's fees previously set down by the North Dakota
Supreme Court.8 The city asserted that reliance on the contingent
fee agreement by the trial court was an abuse of discretion under
state statute. 9 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the award
of expert witness fees made by the trial court,10 and reversed and
remanded the award of attorney's fees. City of Bismarck v. Thorn,
261 N.W.2d 640 (N.D. 1977).
1. City of Bismarck v. Thom, 261 N.W.2d 640, 641 (N.D. 1977). The Thorns were
offered $150,000 for the land. Id.
2. Id.
8. Id.
4. Id. at 642.
5. Id. In accordance with the agreement between the client and attorney, the fee due




9. Id. The statute provides as follows:
The court may in its discretion award to the defendant reasonable actual
or statutory costs or both, which may include interest from the time of tak-
ing except interest on the amount of a deposit which is available for with-
drawal without prejudice to right of appeal, costs on appeal, and reasonable
attorney's fees for' all judicial proceedings. If the defendant appeals and
does not prevail, the costs on appeal may be taxed against him. In all cases
when a new trial has been granted upon the application, of the defendant
and he has failed upon such trial to obtain greater compensaltion than was
allowed him upon the first trial, the costs of such new trial shall be taxed
against him.
N.D. CaNT. CODE § 32-15-32 (1976).
10. 261 N.W.2d at 647. In finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in the awarding of expert witness fees the court said :
William Knudson [the expert witness] did much of the pretrial investi-
gation of comparable sales of the land taken in preparation of the trial. He
made the pretrial investigation which would have been, required by someone
else, and probably at a higher per diem rate.
The trial court determined that the fee allowed was appropriate and that
William Knudson was an expert witness and was entitled to be compensated
as such.
Id.
11. 261 N.W.2d at 647. The trial court was instructed to hold an evidentiary hearing
to determine reasonable attorney's fees in conformity with the court's opinion. Id.
In the Order on Motion for Costs, including Attorney Fees, Appraisers Charges and
Fees Allowed in Condemnation Actions signed by Judge Graff, December 17, 1976, the
criteria for awarding attorney's fees were set out as follows:
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North Dakota defines eminent domain as the right to take pri-
vate property for public use, and specifies that private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compen-
sation first having been made to or paid into court for the owner. 12
The state further allows the court at its discretion to allow the
defendant landowners reasonable actual or statutory costs or both,
including reasonable attorney's fees for all judicial proceedings. 3
Historically, the power of eminent domain has been counter-
balanced with the duty to provide just compensation. 1' The just com-
pensation requirement seeks to protect the individual landowner when
eminent domain is exercised. 15 It is founded upon the equitable prin-
ciple of fairness.16 The government must compensate 7 for the taking
[H]eard the motion for costs . . . the city having caused its return to the
motion to be filed, with affidavits in support of its position, together with a
brief, and the landowners having submitted affidavits showing their items
of expense, including attorneys fees, appraisers fees, with other items of
expense and the parties having caused their arguments to be made by their
counsel, and it having been shown to the Court that counsel for defendants
entered into a contingent fee contract providing for one-third of the increase,
between the original offer and the verdict of the jury, the contingent fee
contract being the kind in, general use in North Dakota in similar cases,
and which was filed herein, together with a record of cases showing allow-
ances in other condemnation trials, in the state, in which similar fees were
upheld, and it also appearing to the court that the jury verdict in this case
caused a settlement to be made in the case of the City of Bismarck against
the Patterson Land Company, due to be tried about two weesk after this
trial was completed, that settlement being for approximately $5,000 per acre.
That it appeared to the Court that counsel for the defendants handled
the testimony of the expert witness of the plaintiff with skill and dex-
terity based upon ;retrial work that they accomplished in the case, and at-
torney fees of one-third of the difference, for the work done in this case,
or the sum of $71,213.13 is a reasonable and proper fee in the light of the
litigation, the preparation thereof, the skill of the presentation, the results
obtained, and the diligence shown by the consel for the defendant owners.
City of Bismarck v. Thom, Civ. No. 24S.30 (4th D. N.D., Dec. 2, 1975).
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-01 (1976). The statute provides as follows:
Eminent domain is the right to take private property for lublic use. Pri-
vate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation first having been made to or paidl into court for the owner.
In case such property is so taken by a person, firm, or private corporation,
no benefit to accrue from the nro-,osed improvement shall be allowed in
ascertaining the compensation to be made therefor. Such compensation in all
cases shall be ascertained by a jury unless a jury is waived. The right of
eminent domain may be exercised in the manner provided in this chapter.
Id.
13. N.D. CENT. CODE .2-15-32 (1976).
14. -[The right of eminent domain] cannot be exercised except upon condition that
just compensation shall be made to the owner. ... I Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S.
553, 562 (1890).
15. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1893); Opinion
of the Justices. 118 Me. 503, 513-14, 106 A. 865, 871-72 (1919) ; In re Mt. Wash. Rd. Co.,
35 N.H. 134, 142 (1857).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950)
Ives v. Addison, 165 Conn. 335, 341, 232 A.2d 311, 314 (1967).
17. The duty to provide just compensation is stated as follows in the U.S. Constitu-
tion: "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.~
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 4.
Every state except New Hampshire and North Carolina have consttutional provi-
sions similar to the fifth amendment's just compensation clailse. In each of those states
the requirement is well-established by statute or case law. 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
8 1.3 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the
Supreme Court held that the just compensation requirement contained in the fifth amend-
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of private lands for public purposes with public funds. In that way
the just compensation requirement distributes the cost of public pro-
jects equally among all members of society to ensure that no indivi-
dual suffers disproportionately for the public good.'
There has been no uniformity on the issue of whether just com-
pensation includes costs, such as attorney's fees, of 'securing that
guarantee. 19 Twenty-nine states have statutes20 which begin with
the proposition, stated directly or by implication, that the condemnor
pays the costs of condemnation proceedings. There are frequently
provisions allowing recovery of costs only if the award is in excess
of any offer by the condemnor, and some set maximum amounts
even in those cases.2 ' North Dakota and eight other jurisdictions 22
ment was imposed on the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause,
and was also founded on common law principles pre-dating the Constitution. The com-
mon law notion of fairness required the sovereign to compensate for property taken from
an individual landowner to promote the common welfare. The just compensation require-
ment was a settled principle of equity recognized by all civilized governments. See Gardner
v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816).
18. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). For a dis-
cussion of how the just compensation requirement functions as a cost distribution device,
see Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 303, 475 P.2d 441, 445, 90 Calt. Rptr. 345, 349
(1970).
19. See Guy, Land Condemnation: A Comparative Survey of North Dakota Statutory
Law, 51 N.D.L. REV. 387, 432 (1974).
20. ALA. CODE tit. 18, § 1-31 (1975) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-77 (West 1964)
DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 6111 (1974) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.091 (West Supp. 1977) ; GA. CODE
ANN. § 36-605 (1970) IND. CODE ANN. § 32-11-1-10 (Burns Supp. 1977) ; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 472-33 (\West 1971) KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (Weeks 1973) ; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 23 §
157 (Supp. 1977) ; M . ANN. CODE art. 21 § 12-107 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
79, § 8A (West 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.175 (West 1977); MISS. CODE ANN. @
11-27-25 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523..070 (Vernon 1953); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-723
(1976) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233:25 (1977) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-13 (West 1969) ;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-59 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-119 (1974) ; OHIO REV.
COD ANN. § 5519.02 (Page Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69 § 1203 (West Supp.
1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 35.34.6 (1973) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 1-519 (Purdon Supp.
1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1539 (Supp. 1977) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 (1977);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 233 (1968) ; VA. CODE § 25-46.32 (1973) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 8.04.080 (1961) ; V. VA. CODE § 54-2-16 (1966).
21. Indiana sets a maximum of $2,500 for litigation costs If the judgment, exclusive
of interest and costs, is greater than the amount specified in the last offer of settlement
made by the condemnor. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-11-1-10 (Burns Supp. 1977).
Pennsylvania has a statutory allowance in all cases limited to $500. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-610 (Purdon Supp. 1977). Full recovery for reasonable expenses actually
incurred for appraisal, attorney and engineering fees is allowed where the landowner
successfully challenges the condemnor's right to appropriate the property or procedures
followed by the condemnor, where the condemnation is revoked by the condemnor, aid
where the condemnor is forced to bring an inverse condemnation proceeding. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 1-406(e), 1-408, 1-609 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
ALAS. R. Civ. P. 82 and 72 provide a discretionary scheme for allowing attorney's
fees in all civil cases with a sliding scale rough guideline based on the amoun.t of re-
covery and whether the controversy is contested or not, and whether or not it is settled
or gors to trial. But in eminent domain proceedings, attorney's fees are allowed only if
the final judgment is at least 10 per cent greater than the greatest amount previously
made avoilable to the landowner.
The avalanche of appeals tinder the Alaska system was so great that the state bar
association passed a resolution calling for repeal of the enabling legislation. Comment,
Award of Attorscey's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAS. L. REV.
129, 130, 145 (1974).
22. ALAS. R. Civ. P. 82 (Supp. 1968), 72 (Supp. 1963) ; ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1128
(Supp. 1977) : IDAtIO COoE § 7-718 (1948) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 37.190 (1973) ; N.D. CENT.
CODE) § 32-15-32 (Supp. 1973) ; W S. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (West Supp. 1978) ; Wyo. R. CiV.
P. 71.1 (Supp. 1975).
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have provisions allowing attorney's fees,23 sometimes at the discre-
tion of the court.
24
In United Development Corporation v. State Highway Depart-
ment,2 15 the court pointed out that the legislature provided for the
awarding of costs to a prevailing party in civil actions. 26 In addition,
the court stated that the owner of an interest in real estate whose
property is taken by eminent domain proceedings can recover the
costs of the action. 27 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed an
award of attorney's fees that corrsponded with a contingent fee
agreement. 28 The decision also stated the guidelines for determining
reasonable attorney's fees under North Dakota statutory provi-
sions.2 9 The reasonable fee was the result of balancing the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, the amount and character of
the services renderd, the results, obtained, the customary fee charged
for the services and the ability and skill of the attorney.3 0 The
supreme court also mentioned that the minimum fee :schedule of the
North Dakota Bar Association may be used as an indicator of the
reasonableness of the fee.31
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Morton County Board of
Park Commissioners v. Wetsch32 ruled that basing an award of at-
torney's fees on a contingent fee agreement without consideration of
other factors was improper, in spite of a statement by the lower
court that such fees were reasonable. The court reiterated the fac-
tors from United Development and stated that attorney's fees which
23. The just compensation guarantee of the fifth amendment does not require that the
condemnee be reimbursed for attorney's fees. See, e.g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362,
368 (1930); United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973) ; United States v. 2,353.28 Acres of Land, 414 F.2d 965,
972 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 158 F. Supp. 122, 125 (M.D. Pa
1957); United States v. 251.81 Acres of Land, 50 F. Supp. 81, 83 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
24. North Dakota enacted N.D. CENT. CODE: § 32-15-32 in 1957. United Dev. Corp. v.
State Highway Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439, 443 (N.D. 1965) decided by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in 1965, was the first appeal of attorney's fees awarded under this sec-
tion. Since that time the court has ruled five times on appeals of attorney's fees in emi-
nent domain cases. City of Bismarck v. Thom, 261 N.W.2d' 640 (N.D. 1977); Sauvegeau
v. Hjelle, 213 N.W.2d 381 (N.D. 1972); Mun. Airport Auth. of Fargo v. Stockman, 198
N.W.2d 212 (N.D. 1972); Morton County Bd. of Park Comm'rs v. Wetsch, 142 N.W.2d
751 (N.D. 1966) ; Morton County Bd. of Park Comm'rs v. Wetsch, 136 N.W.2d 158 (N.D.
1965).
25. 133 N.W.2d 439 (N.D. 1965).
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-01 (Supp. 1977) provides as follows:
1. Except as provided in subsection 2, the amount of fees of attorneys
In civil actions must be left to the agreement, express or implied, of the
parties.
2. In all civil actions the court may, in its discretion, upon a finding
that the pleading was frivolous, award reasonablb actual or statutory costs,
or both, including reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-32 (1976).
28. There was an attempt to tax $9,000 in costs for various attorneys employed by the
defendants. The total contingent fee owed, however, was shown to be $4,650. The court
allowed the latter amount. United Dev. Corp. v. State Highway Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439,
445-46 (N.D. 1965).
29. Id. at 446.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 116 N.W.2d 158 (N.D. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Wetsch I].
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the trial court finds reasonable could be less than, more than, or equal
to the contingent fee amount.-3
In a second action by the same name34 the North Dakota Su-
preme Court expanded on a South Dakota court holding that "the
court is an expert on what is a reasonable fee." '3 5 The supreme
court provided additional guidelines to be considered by the appeals
court when reviewing a trial court's award of attorney's fees 36
When reviewing an award of attorney's fees, the appeals court must
consider that the trial court judge would be in a position to recognize
the character of the litigation, the preparation and skill of the presen-
tation, and the results obtained in the case before him and to temper
that with his own knowledge and experience in awarding reasonable
attorney's fees.37 Absent an affirmative showing that the award con-
stituted an abuse of discretion, the award would not be overturned
on appeal.3 9 Using the United Development criteria 39 the court af-
firmed an award of an amount equal to the amount called for by
the contingent fee contract.4 0
The supreme court in Municipal Airport Authority of Fargo v.
Stockman41 added a fifth consideration to the test stated in United
Development and Wetsch I, specifically, "careful, conscientious
and capable manner-customary fee-contingent fee contract-
ability and skill."4 2 A concurring minority clarified this by stating
that any contingent fee agreement should not be considered by the
trial court in determining reasonable attorney's fees.1 3 When all
factors were considered," the court affirmed an award of attorney's
33. Id. at 159.
34. Morton County Bd. of Park Comm'rs v.. Wetsch, 142 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as Wetsch II].
35. Kerr v. Kerr, 74 S.I. 454, 54 N.W.2d 357 (1952).
36. Wetsch I, 142 N.W.2d at 752.
37. Id.
38. Wetsch II, 142 N.W.2d at 752, quoting Bartholomay v. St. Thomas Lumber Co., 124
N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1963).
39. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
40. Wetsch II, 142 N.',V.2d at 753.
41. 198 N.W.2d 212( N.D. 1972).
42. Id. at 215.
43. The fee charged is not a reasonable fee because it Is a fee which [the at-
torney] is permitted to charge his client under their contingent fee agree-
ment; it ts a reasonable fee because of the character of the services ren-
dered, the results obtained, the customary charges for such services, and the
ability and skill of the attorney rendering the services. The contingent fee
agreement, in such situation, should not be considered by the trial court in
determining what is a reasonable attorney fee. Id. at 217 (Strutz, C.J., con-
curring).
44. In determining reasonable attorney's fees the court considered the motion for al-
lowance of attorney fees, the affidavits supporting that motion, the return of the Airport
Authority, briefs by the rarties, oral presentations, and files and records In the case. The
court determined that one and a half years were spent in the preparation for trial, that
trial represented five consolidated suits, that the trial lasted three and one half days, and
that analysis of the commercial and industrial potential of the property took legal skill,
technique and considerable preparation. Total attorney's fees of $43,466.83, one-third of
the award in excess of the amount offered, constituted reasonable fees. Mun. Airport Auth.
of Fargo v. Stockman, 198 N.W.2d 212, 214, 216 (N.D. 1972).
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fees which was exactly the same as the fee called for under the con-
tingent fee contract.
45
Stockman reiterated the principle stated in Wetsch II that the
court was an expert in determining reasonable attorney's fees and
that the determination of the trial judge is final in the absence of an
affirmative showing of an abuse of discretion. 4
The supreme court in City of Bismarck v. Thornm 4 7 determined
that the special concurring opinion in Stockman4 8 did not intend the
term "customary fee charged" to include the contingent fee agree-
ment and asserted that the term instead referred to the hourly rate
or its equivalent.49
The court in Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Reparations Board,"
considered reasonable attorney's fees under the North Dakota Crime
Victims Reparations Act51 and adopted guidelines5 2 expanding those
set out in the eminent domain cases. 3 The court said in awarding
reasonable attorney's fees it would consider the following: the time
and labor required; 54 the novelty and difficulty of the question; 55
45. Id. at 214.
Sauvegeau v. HJelle, 213 N.W.2d 381 (N.D. 1973), reaffirmed the United Develop-
ment test and the Wetsch II assertion that it is within the trial court's authority to award
attorney's fees equal to the contingent fee. Savegeau was a case of a partial taking of
land for freeway purposes in which the court held that attorney's fees would be based on
the difference between the jury's award and the amount deposited in court rather than
the award and an amended offer made by the state during the course of trial.
The record supports the position that the commissioner's original deposit
was based on an erroneous appraisal. We cannot say as a matter of law,
based upon the record here, that the subsequent increase in appraised valua-
tion by the Commissioner was not due to the skill, knowledge, experience
and efforts of counsel for the landowners, showing the need for an Increase
in the deposit by the Commissioner. Id. at 381, 393.
46. 198 N.V.2d at 213.
47. 261 N.WV.2d 640 (N.D. 1977).
48. See, supra note 43.
49. 261 N.W.2d at 643.
50. 246 N.W.2d 774 (N.D. 1976).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-13 (Supp. 1977) provides as follows:
As part of an order, the [reparations] board shall determine and award
reasonable attorney's fees, commensurate with services rendered, to be paid
by the state to the attorney representing the claimant. Additional attorney's
fees may be awarded by a court in the event of review. Attorney's fees
may be denied on a. finding that the claim or appeal is frivolous. Awards of
attorney's fees shall be in addition to awards of reparations and may be made
whether or not reparations are awarded. It Is unlawful for an attorney to
contract for or receive any larger sum than the amount allowed.
Id.
52. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway & Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974).
53. Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Reparations Bd., 246 N.W.2d 774, 777 (N.D. 1976).
54. Johnson v. Georgia Highway & Express, Inc., 48S F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974).
Although hours spent should not be the only basis for determining a fee, they are a neces-
sary ingredient. The tial judge should weigh the hours claimed in light of his own know-
ledge, experience, and expertise in the time required to complete analogous activities. The
Possibility of duplication must be considered if more than one attorney is involved. If
there are more lawyers in the courtroom than necessary, the additional time should be
discounted. Investigation, clerical work, and compilation of facts and statistics, even if
performed by an attorney, should be compensated at a lesser rate. Id.
55. Id. at 718. Cases of first impression generally require more time and effort. The
attorney should be anpropriately compensated for accepting the challenge of undertaking a
case which might make new law. Id.
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the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 56 the pre-
clusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of
the case;5 7 the customary fee; 58 whether the fee is fixed or con-
tingent;5 9 time limitations imposed by the client or the circum-
stances; 60 the amount involved and the results obtained; 61 the ex-
perience, reputation, and ability of the attorney;6 2 the undesirability
of the case;6 3 the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client;"4 and awards in similar cases.6 5
In utilizing these criteria in establishing its new guidelines, the
court in Thom also looked to two cases decided by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1974 dealing with reasonable attorney's fees
under the Clayton Act.66 The court in Thorn maintained that despite
the difference between antitrust actions and eminent domain pro-
56. Id. The trial judge should carefully observe the attorney's work product, prepara-
tion, and general ability in court, using his own exrerence as a lawyer and his observa-
tions from the bench. Id.
57. Id. Once otherwise available business is foreclosed, first, because of conflicts of
Interest which occur from the case and, second, from the fact that once the case is as-
sumed the attorney has made a commitment of time to his client and has reduced or
eliminaed time for other purposes. Id.
58. Id. The customary fee in the community for similar work should' be considered.
However, the fee for strictly legal work should never fall below the $20 per hour pre-
scribed by the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d,) (1) (Supp. 1978). As long as
minimum fee schedules are in existence and are customarily followed by the lawyers in a
given community, they should be taken into consideration. 48, F.2d at 718.
59. Id. The fee quoted to the client or the percentage of recovery agreed to is a helpful
guideline in demonstrating the attorney's expectations. Such arrangements are not binding
on the court, and may limit the amount of the award to the maximum the client is con-
tractually bound to pay, or less. Id.
60. Id. Priority work which delays the attorney's other legal work is entitled to a
premium. This is particularly important when counsel joins a case well along In pro-
ceedings. Id.
61. Id. Although the court should consider the amount of damages, it should not over-
look the decision's effect on the law. If the decision corrects across-the-board [problems]
the attorney's fee award should reflect the relief granted. Id.
62. Id. at 718-19. Most fee schedules reflect an experience differential. There should
also be a difference reflecting a specialty if there is corresponding ability. Id.
63. Id. at 719. For example, civil rights attorneys face hari11ships in their communities
because of their desire to help the civil rights litigant. Often the person's decision to help
eradicate discrimination will not be pleasantly received by the community, having an ad-
verse economic impact on the person's practice. Id.
64. Id. An attorney in private practice may vary his fee for similar work in light of
the professional relationship with the client. The court may consider this factor in its
determination. Id.
65. Id. Reasonableness may also be judged in light of awards made in similar litiga-
tion in and out of the court's circuit. Id.
66. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Grinnell I]. It dalt with private antitrust national class actions. Of interest here is the
ruling that a $10 million settlement was not inadequate as a matter of law but that $1.5
million in attorney's fees was excessive. The court adopted the concept that the purpose
of the equitable fee award is to "compensate the attorney for the reasonable value of
services benefittina the . . . claimant." Id. at 470, qvoting Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corn., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973).
The Grinnell I court, citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245
F. Sinp. 258, 302 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated an other grounds, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967),
af'd in part and rev'd in part, 392 U.S. 481 (1968), adopted eight "generally accepted
factors to be weighed in determining a reasonable attorney's fee", as follows: (1)
whether the plaintiff's counsel had the benefit of a prior judgment or decree in a case
brought by the government; (2) standing of the counsel at bar for both sides; (3) time
and labor spent: (4) magnitude and complexity of the litigation; (5) responsibility un-
dertnken : (C) amount rcovered: (7) the knowle:ge the court has of conferences, argu-
ments presented and of work shown by the record to have been done by attorneys prior
to trial; and, (8) what it would be reasonable for counsel to charge a victorious plaintiff.
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ceedings, the same factors should be considered in establishing rea-
sonable attorney's fees. 67
For a North Dakota trial court to determine reasonable attorney's
fees pursuant to statute68 and in accordance with the guidelines set
up in Thorn it is first necessary to determine the number of hours
expended6 9 and the appropriate hourly rates.70 These are to be the
predominant factors.71 In addition, the trial court should consider
the factors established in United Development.2
The Thom ruling specifies that reasonable attorney's fees cannot
be based on any single item and allows the trial judge, to include
other factors he finds significant.7 3 However, the court must rely on
evidence and justify its award in specific findings.74
The dissent in Thorn argued that the majority decision to base
awards on hourly rates guarantees the result that "heads the State
wins, and tails, the landowner loses. ' ' 75 The, dissent pointed out that
if the attorney fails to get an award greater than the amount. on
deposit for settlement, he gets nothing, 76 which is the classic con-
tingent fee situation. In addition, under the Thorn decision, the at-
torney would get only an hourly rate, and the risk of no recovery
wfuld .till exist without the balancing benefit of the possibility of
a large -ncrease.77
The new guidelines appear to provide wide latitude in setting
awards of reasonable attorney's fees. Even if it happens that awards
continue at the contingent fee level as they have in the past, the
lower courts are at least put on notice that they must fully document
and justify such awards.
CHERYL L. ELLIS
Risk in litiga.tion was listed, as an additional factor to be considered. 245 F. Supp. at 302.
In a subsequent decision, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp, 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Grinnell II], the award of attorney's fees and other costs for
employment of paraprofessionals and accountants determined on remand was appealed.
The court reduced the award to a reasonable amount, the reduction reflecting the lack
of any risk of litigation factor, lack of complexity of the issues, the fact that although
the class action expanded from 21 clients with purchases of $1 million to 14,000 claimants
with total purchases of $38 million the increase did not aopear to have resulted exclusively
from the Ingenuity and preseverance of the attorney, the case had many precedents, and
the elimination of a charge for time spent in preparing the fee application which bene-
fitted the attorney, but not the client. Id.
67, 261 N.V.2d at 645.
68, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-1.5-32 (1976).
69. 261 N.W.2d at 646. Findings of hours expended should be based upon contempor-
aneous records or, when not available, upon reasonable reconstruction or estimates of
time. Id.
70. Id. This Is to be based upon the attorney's experience and reputation and can be
adjusted upwards or downwards on the basis of an objective evaluation of the complexity
and novelty of the litigation and the corresponding degree of skill displayed by the at-
torney. Id.
71. Id.
72. 133 N.V.2d at 443.
73. 261 NAV.2d at 646.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 650 (Vogel, J., dissenting)-
76. Id.
77. Id.
